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Abstract: The paper estimates average effective tax rates on consump-
tion, labor and capital income for Mexico, using the method of Mendoza
et al. (1994) and related extensions, including two novel refinements. On
average, it is found that consumption taxes are roughly between 7 and
14%, whereas labor and capital income taxes are between 8 and 12.5%,
and 8.5 and 15%, respectively. Tax estimates are found to be consistent
with predictions from theory in general, both for Mexico as well as for a
sample of OECD countries.
Keywords: effective tax rates, consumption tax, factor income taxes,
international tax policy
Resumen: El artículo estima los impuestos efectivos promedio al consumo
y a los ingresos al capital y al trabajo para México, de acuerdo con la me-
todología de Mendoza et al. (1994) y a extensiones del mismo, incluyendo
dos refinamientos novedosos. En promedio, se encuentra que los impuestos
al consumo se ubican entre 7 y 14%, mientras que los impuestos al trabajo
y al capital están entre 8 y 12.5%, y 8.5 y 15%, respectivamente. En gene-
ral, estas estimaciones son consistentes con las predicciones de la teoría,
tanto para el caso de México como para una muestra de países de la OCDE.
Palabras clave: impuestos efectivos, impuesto al consumo, impuestos a
ingresos factoriales, política fiscal internacional
Introduction
ax estimates are a very important tool of analysis in modern mac-
roeconomics. For this reason, during the last years some efforts
have been made to estimate taxes on key macroeconomic variables that
are fully consistent with the representative agent framework. The semi-
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nal paper by Mendoza et al. (1994) and the extensions made by Carey
and Tchilinguirian (2000), OECD (2001) and Carey and Rabesona (2002a)
are precisely devoted to such a task. These authors report estimates on
consumption, labor and capital income taxes over time for the major
industrial countries based on aggregate macroeconomic data at hand.
The idea is to measure tax rates as ad valorem estimates, where tax
rates are simply calculated as the ratio of total revenues over the
total tax base for each variable.1 A major advantage of this approach
in general is that it does not require collecting detailed information on
household income, statutory tax schedules and other aspects of the tax
law, or even projections of real present values for investment projects
for particular industries.
As well known, a problem with the general approach by Mendoza
et al. (1994) is the lack of detailed data on national accounts. For ex-
ample, income of the self-employed is not disentangled between its
labor and capital components. The way Mendoza et al. (1994) circum-
vent this problem is by assigning all this income to capital. However,
this assumption biases the estimates for labor (capital) income taxes
upward (downward), as illustrated later in this paper. Thus, a major
concern is how to provide alternative estimation methods for the la-
bor component of self-employed income.
Despite the usefulness of these estimates for analysis, little is
known about tax rates facing households and firms at the aggregate
level in Mexico. Rico (1996) calculates average effective tax rates on
consumption, capital and labor income taxes in Mexico for the period
1960-93, following the method by Mendoza et al. (1994) and using
data from different sources. Dalsgaard (2000) also provides estimates
for average effective tax rates on consumption, labor and capital inco-
me from 1980 to 1996 in Mexico. However, due to the lack of detailed
data on national accounts at that time, estimation requires some as-
sumptions on self-employment income and household property income
using information from the 1994 Household Survey. The author does
not consider alternative approaches to estimation either.
Given the discussion above, the goal of this paper is threefold. First,
to provide alternative methods to calculate the labor component of
self-employed income as a way of complementing the method by Men-
doza et al. (1994). Second, to refine the tax estimates provided by Rico
1 These taxes are usually known in the literature as “average effective tax rates”, “implicit
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(1996) and Dalsgaard (2000) for Mexico by considering alternative
methods of estimation based on both consistent and superior informat-
ion now readily available. Finally, to test whether the results pro-
vided here yield macroeconomic implications in accord with theory.
As a first approximation, the seminal method of Mendoza et al.
(1994) is used to estimate time series on consumption, labor and capital
income taxes in Mexico. The method is then extended to incorporate
the observations made by Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000), OECD (2001)
and Carey and Rabesona (2002a). These studies basically point out
the need both to include additional taxes into the analysis and to re-
lax the assumption that all income of the self-employed is computed
as capital income. However, as discussed later, the approach of Carey
and Rabesona (2002a) may not reflect accurately the division of self-
employed income into its labor and capital components. For this rea-
son, two additional methods are presented following the suggestions
of Gollin (2002) in order to calculate this labor component. As Gollin
(2002) is only concerned about estimating income shares from national
accounts, this paper ends up presenting two alternative approaches
for measuring effective tax rates not previously considered in the lit-
erature.
Annual information required to estimate tax ratios in Mexico comes
from public sources such as OECD Revenue Statistics and INEGI, Cuentas
por sectores institucionales, tomo II. Unfortunately, this last publica-
tion is only available for the period 1993-2001, restricting severely
the period of study especially for labor and capital income taxes as it
will become clear later. As for consumption taxes, the period covered
goes from 1988 to 2002 since consistent data from national accounts
is only available for that period.
The results may be summarized as follows. Estimates for the con-
sumption tax in Mexico are sensitive to the method used. For example,
the approach by Mendoza et al. (1994) exhibits a gradual decline in
taxes from 1988 to 1993 followed by a gradual increase since that date
on, for an average of 7.1% over the whole period. On the other hand,
the method by Carey and Rabesona (2002a) also exhibits a general
decline from 1988 to 1994, but taxes rather fluctuate from that date
on, yielding a total average of about 12 or 14% depending on the as-
sumptions made for the tax base. In a similar manner, estimates on
factor income taxes may also vary widely depending on the approach
in use. In particular, the average labor income tax for the whole pe-
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is between 8.5 and 15%. However, the four methods yield similar trends
over time for labor and capital income taxes. For example, they unam-
biguously exhibit a gradual increase in both taxes since 1996. Overall,
the findings illustrate that the levels of taxation in Mexico are far
below the OECD average (see Mendoza et al., 1994; OECD, 2001; and
Carey and Rabesona, 2002a). At the same time, they may also suggest
that the Mexican tax system distorts less the incentives to work, save
and invest compared with most other OECD countries (Dalsgaard, 2000).
Tax estimates for Mexico are then used to test some macroeco-
nomic implications from theory. In particular, two set of exercises are
performed: the relationship between labor supply and labor taxation,
and the effect of higher capital income taxes on the private invest-
ment ratio. These exercises are implemented both at the individual
level for Mexico as well as for a sample of OECD countries for which
information is available. With the exception of the relationship be-
tween labor supply and labor income taxes in Mexico, tax estimates
are consistent with predictions found elsewhere. In particular, the
result of Prescott (2004) where labor taxation may account for large
differences in labor supply between the US and some major European
countries is also suggested by the results presented in this paper us-
ing a larger sample of countries including Mexico. On the other hand,
the negative relationship between investment ratios and capital in-
come taxes reported in Mendoza et al. (1997) and Mendoza and Tesar
(2005) using a smaller sample of OECD countries is also found here,
both for the Mexican case in isolation as well as for a larger sample of
OECD countries.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. The next section men-
tions briefly some particularities of the Mexican tax system in an in-
ternational context. Section II describes in detail the method by
Mendoza et al., as well as the other three alternative approaches. Tax
estimates for Mexico are reported and compared in section III. Sec-
tion IV discusses some macroeconomic implications of tax rates. The
last section concludes.
I. International Comparison of Tax Revenues
The tax system in Mexico is usually viewed as one of contrasting fea-
tures. On the one hand, disincentives to work, save and invest appear
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the system also exhibits serious problems in terms of revenue capac-
ity and efficiency (Dalsgaard, 2000). In a recent study of public debt
among countries (IMF, 2003), Mexico stands as one with the lowest
public revenue/GDP share. This assertion is supported by Figure 1,
which shows the tax revenue/GDP ratio average for a sample of se-
lected countries over the period 1990-2000. As noticed, the 17% ratio
for Mexico is well below the OECD average of 37% and even below the
corresponding ratio for similar countries such as Chile, Argentina and
Brazil. If oil revenue is excluded from the analysis, the tax revenue
share for Mexico decreases even further to 12.6%, a number four times
smaller than Sweden’s.
Some evidence on the composition of public revenue is presented
in Figure 2. Here the share of tax revenue out of total revenue (i.e.,
tax plus non-tax revenue) is estimated over the period 1990-2000 for
a sample of selected countries. If oil revenue is defined as tax revenue
(following OECD, Revenue Statistics classification), such a share is about
87% for Mexico. This number is roughly the average for OECD coun-
tries excluding Mexico, and above the estimate for countries such as
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the United States, Germany and Canada.2 However, if oil revenue is
now defined as non-tax revenue (following the classification of Mexico’s
Ministry of Finance), tax revenues only account for 63% of total rev-
enues, the smallest number by far among the sample.
Overall, what Figures 1 and 2 indicate is that public revenue in
Mexico heavily relies on oil revenue. Furthermore, the share of tax
revenue in terms of GDP is very small according to international eviden-
ce, even if oil revenue is fully taken into account. For these two reasons,
one should expect low average effective tax rates in Mexico relative to
those in other countries, an issue addressed in the next two sections.












































































































































































2 Estimates for Figure 2 are based on the methodology set in the 1986 version of the
Manual on Government Finance Statistics by the IMF. Estimates using the 2001 version of
the Manual are not considered since long time series data are not available for several coun-
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II. Estimation Methods
To estimate average effective tax rates for Mexico, the method origi-
nally proposed by Mendoza et al. (1994) and later revised by Carey
and Tchilinguirian (2000), OECD (2001) and Carey and Rabesona
(2002a) is followed. The general idea under this approach is to esti-
mate taxes on consumption, labor and capital income from aggregate
information on tax revenues and tax bases for each of these compo-
nents. This method thus produces aggregate effective tax rates that
in fact correspond to average tax rates realized for the period of study. In
particular, a major advantage of this approach is that these tax rates
aggregate information on statutory taxes, credits, deductions and ex-
emptions implicit in national accounts and revenue statistics. In ad-
dition, the method is fully consistent with the representative agent
framework, so the results obtained provide valuable information for
calibrating general equilibrium models of this type.
As explained in detail in Mendoza et al. (1994), tax rates are mea-
sured as ad valorem estimates by classifying all the forms of tax rev-
enue at the general government level into one of the three taxes in
question. Each measure of tax revenue is then expressed as a fraction
of its corresponding tax base (i.e., consumption, wages and the overall
operating surplus in the economy). The result of this ratio corresponds
to the average effective tax ratio for each variable.
A major advantage of this approach is that information required
to estimate tax ratios is readily available. For example, the OECD Rev-
enue Statistics systematically collects data on tax revenue for member
countries on an annual basis. All other data is provided by national
accounts. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the equations pre-
sented below, Table 1 conveniently contains the key to tax revenue
concepts as reported by OECD Revenue Statistics, whereas Table 2 de-
scribe the variables of interest from national accounts and other macro-
economic aggregates.
II.1. The Mendoza et al. Method
As a first approximation for estimating tax rates, the method of
Mendoza et al. (1994) is described below. The authors calculate the
average effective tax rates for consumption, labor and capital income
as follows, based on the information provided in Tables 1 and 2:192 Antón Sarabia: Average Effective Tax Rates in Mexico
Table 1. Key to Variables from Revenue Statistics, OECD
Key Variable name
1100 Taxes on income, profits and capital gains of individuals or households
1200 Taxes on income, profits and capital gains of corporations
2000 Total social security contributions (2 100 is paid by employees; 2 200 by
employers; 2 300 by the self-employed and persons outside the labor
force; 2 400 is unallocated)
3000 Taxes on payroll and workforce
4000 Taxes on property
4100 Recurrent taxes on immovable property
4400 Taxes on financial and capital transactions
5110 General taxes on goods and services (5 111 VAT)
5120 Taxes on specific goods and services (5 121 excise taxes; 5 122 profits
of fiscal monopolies; 5 123 customs and import duties; 5 124 taxes on
exports; 5 125 taxes on investment goods; 5 126 taxes on specific
services; 5127 other taxes on international trade and transactions; 5 128
other taxes)
5200 Taxes on use of goods and performances (5 212 taxes on motor vehicles
paid by others than households)
6100 Other taxes paid solely by businesses
Table 2. Key to Macroeconomic Aggregates
Key Variable name
CP Private final consumption expenditure
EE Dependent employment
ES Self-employment
CG Government final consumption expenditure
CGW Government final wage consumption expenditure
OS Net operating surplus of the overall economy
OSPUE Unincorporated business net income (also called mixed income)
PEI Interest, dividends and investment receipts
W Wages and salaries of dependent employment
WSSS Compensation of employees (including private employers’ contribu-














































where τc, τh, τl and τk denote taxes on consumption, total household
income, labor and capital income, respectively.3 Notice that (1) – (4)
simply capture the idea that each tax is estimated as the ratio of tax
revenues over its corresponding tax base. As evident from (1), the es-
timation of consumption taxes under this approach is based mostly
on VAT and excise taxes.
II.2. Alternative Methods
As it is well known, the method of Mendoza et al. (1994) is not exempt
from criticisms (cf. Carey and Tchilinguirian, 2000; OECD, 2001; and
Carey and Rabesona, 2002a). Among them, there are two concerns
that deserve a special comment. First, Mendoza et al. only include a
partial list of all the taxes available as reported by the Revenue Sta-
tistics. Second, the calculations provided above assign all the income
of the self-employed to capital.4 In order to account for these short-
comings, three alternative methods are proposed and discussed below
in detail.
3 Data on household taxes do not make the distinction between taxes paid on labor and
capital income. To deal with this problem, Mendoza et al. (1994) assume that households pay
the same effective tax rates on capital and labor income, as reflected by (2) – (4).
4 Typically the income of the self-employed is included as OSPUE in the national accounts.
Unfortunately, this information is usually not divided between its labor and capital components
for several countries including Mexico.194 Antón Sarabia: Average Effective Tax Rates in Mexico
The first alternative follows the suggestion by Carey and Rabesona
(2002a) to both include additional taxes and divide the self-employed
income into its capital and labor components. Accordingly, taxes on
consumption, labor and capital are now given by:
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is the wage of the self-employed, and τh is estimated as before.
By comparing equations (1) and (5), the estimate for the consump-
tion tax now includes additional indirect taxes, whereas the tax base
is expressed in gross terms (i.e., including indirect taxes) in order to
make it comparable with the denominator for labor and capital in-
come taxes in (6) and (7), where the tax base is also expressed in gross
terms.5 Equation (6) now defines the tax base as the compensation of
employees (including the contributions of private employers to social
security and pension funds) plus payroll taxes as they are elements of
wage compensation. The denominator in (6) also includes an addi-
tional term, the wage of the self-employed WSE defined by (8). Here,
(8) implicitly captures the idea that the self-employed “pay themselves”
the same annual salary net of social security contributions as that
earned by the average employee. The term WSE is also used to calcu-
5 See OECD (2001) and Carey and Rabesona (2002a) for a discussion on this issue. An
alternative would be to subtract all the indirect taxes from the denominator in (5) so that
consumption expenditures are evaluated at pre-tax prices, following the spirit of equation (1).
Both alternatives are considered in the estimation section below.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2005 195
late the tax revenue from total labor income as shown in the numera-
tor of equation (6).6
Finally, expression (7) simply includes new taxes on capital in-
come in the numerator and redefines the tax base in such a way that
the denominators from expressions (6) and (7) are just equal to GDP.
This specification thus captures the idea that taxes are entirely allocat-
ed to one or other of the factors of production. Overall, this alternative
method is a good approximation to the extent that the self-employed
earn essentially the same wages as people who work as employees.
As pointed out by Carey and Rabesona (2002a), the disadvantage
of this last method is that it may not reflect accurately the division of
self-employed income into its labor and capital components, given the
diversity of such shares among the self-employed. In addition, this
method is inappropriate if it is believed that there are systematic dif-
ferences in earning abilities between employees and the self-employed.
An alternative approach takes thus into account the suggestion
made by Gollin (2002) in which all the OSPUE is assigned to labor.7 The
idea captured by this assumption is that the self-employed provide al-
most pure labor services in low and middle-income countries like
Mexico. If this assumption seems appropriate, the estimates for average
effective tax rates on labor and capital income would now be given by:
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6 Equation (6) originally proposed by Carey and Rabesona (2002a) also includes the term
α * 2400 in the numerator, and the term 2300 in both numerator and denominator, where α is
the fraction of total income that goes to labor (including labor income of the self-employed).
Unfortunately, the information on social security contributions paid by the self-employed (2300)
and others (2400) is not available for Mexico for the period under study. However, it seems
reasonable to assume that the value for these items is approximately zero. For example, only
0.8% of all the social security contributions to IMSS was provided under the voluntary regime in
2002 (see IMSS, 2003). These contributions would typically fall into category (2300), (2400) or
even both, depending on the particular situation. This explains why these terms are in fact
ignored from the analysis, as reflected by (6) and (7).
7 The remaining two last approaches are more concerned about estimating the labor in-
come component out of total income from the self-employed. As such, the estimate for consump-
tion taxes in (5) is not affected, so the last two methods reduce the discussion to the estimation
of labor and capital income taxes. It is important to emphasize that Gollin (2002) is only con-
cerned about estimating labor shares at the macroeconomic level and not on estimating taxes
on the factors of production. In this sense, the remaining two approaches presented here are
new in the literature on the estimation of average effective tax rates.196 Antón Sarabia: Average Effective Tax Rates in Mexico
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The difference between (6) and (9) is that the estimate for the im-
puted wage of the self-employed is replaced by OSPUE. Compared to
(7), expression (10) is adjusted to take into account the new assump-
tion and also includes new taxes, following the suggestion by Carey
and Rabesona (2002a).
As the reader may have already noticed, the problem with this
approach is that even in poor and middle income countries the self-
employed tend to have substantial amounts of capital in their busi-
nesses. In other words, the former method tends to overstate the labor
income received by the self-employed. Following Gollin (2002), a third
alternative would assume that labor and capital income shares for
the self-employed are just the same as for the rest of the economy.
This method implicitly assumes that labor and capital shares are ap-
proximately the same in private unincorporated enterprises as they
are in large corporations and the government sector. As in the case of
the first alternative method, the problem of this approach is the as-
sumption of assigning the same income shares to establishments that
differ significantly in size and structure. Keeping this objection in


































represents the labor share in total income, and IT denotes indirect
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III. Results
As already mentioned, a major advantage for using the alternative
methods presented above is that they rely on information readily avail-
able. In particular, data are taken from OECD Revenue Statistics and
INEGI’s Sistema de cuentas nacionales de México: Cuentas por sectores
institucionales, tomo II. The first publication is extremely useful in
the sense that it contains information on tax revenues at the general
government level and on a cash basis.8 The publication by INEGI has
the advantage of providing information on national accounts disen-
tangled among households, corporations and the general government.
Unfortunately this information is only available starting 1993, so for
tax estimates on capital and labor income below this is in fact the first
year of the series. This is not the case for the estimation of consump-
tion taxes, which do not require detailed information at the national
level. In such a case, the series start in 1988 because consistent infor-
mation from national accounts is only available from that date on.
III.1. Consumption Taxes
Time series estimates for consumption taxes using the Mendoza et al.
approach (i.e., equation (1)) are presented in the second column of
Table 3 for the period 1988-2002 in Mexico. Estimates show a steady de-
cline in the consumption tax from 1988 to 1993, year in which it reaches
its minimum. Thereafter, the tax follows an upward trend in general
until reaching a level in 2002 similar to its level of 1988. Interestingly,
the decrease in the general VAT rate from 15 to 10% in 1992 is well
captured for 1993, but not for 1994.9 Despite the increase in the gen-
eral VAT rate from 10 to 15% in 1995, the estimate for the consump-
tion tax remains constant in 1995 and 1996, and in fact decreases
slightly relative to its 1994 value. According to this method, the rea-
son is that the tax base increases at a larger rate than tax revenue.10
08 IMF, Government Finance Statistics is less appropriate for this type of exercises, since it
typically contains data on central government (ignoring state and local taxes) and reports bud-
get estimates rather than cash receipts.
09 The VAT rate applying to border areas was raised from 6 to 10% in 1992. This 10% rate
prevails until today. A summary of tax reform measures in Mexico for the period 1987-98 may
be found in Dalsgaard (2000).
10 The annual increase in VAT revenue was 34 and 39% in nominal terms during 1995 and
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Estimates corresponding to the Carey and Rabesona (2002a) method
(equation (5)) are presented in the third column of Table 3 (labeled as
C&R1). Now the results for the consumption tax increase about five
percentage points on average under the new method, mostly as a con-
sequence of introducing additional taxes. Interestingly, the consump-
tion tax under this alternative method follows a different trend for
some particular years, as depicted more clearly in Figure 3. Notice-
able, the VAT decrease of 1992 and its increase three years later are
well captured under this method.
As pointed out earlier, an alternative to equation (5) is to estimate
the tax base at pre-tax prices rather than in gross terms. For this
reason, the last column of Table 3 (labeled C&R2) presents consump-
tion taxes under this alternative. On average, taxes increases by 1.7
percentage points but the results are not qualitatively affected, as
illustrated in Figure 3.
In their seminal paper, Mendoza et al. (1994) exclude import and
export taxes as they represent a minimal fraction of taxes on goods
and services in G–7 countries. However, for a small open economy like
Table 3. Average Effective Tax Rates on Consumption (in Percentage)
Year Mendoza et al. C&R1 C&R1 open C&R2
1988 8.2 13.2 0.7 15.2
1989 7.7 13.2 1.1 15.2
1990 7.2 12.9 1.3 14.8
1991 6.7 12.3 1.5 14.0
1992 6.1 11.5 1.6 13.1
1993 5.8 10.6 1.3 11.9
1994 6.5 10.4 1.2 11.6
1995 6.1 12.3 0.8 14.1
1996 6.1 13.2 0.8 15.2
1997 6.9 13.4 0.8 15.5
1998 7.5 11.2 0.8 12.6
1999 8.3 11.6 0.8 13.1
2000 7.2 13.1 0.8 15.1
2001 7.7 12.4 0.6 14.1
2002 8.1 11.5 0.6 13.0
Average 7.1 12.2 1.0  13.9
Source: Author’s estimates as described in the text.
C&R1: Carey and Rabesona (2002a) method with tax base expressed in gross terms.
C&R1 open: includes consumption taxes related to international trade only.
C&R2: Carey and Rabesona (2002a) method with tax base expressed at pre-tax prices.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2005 199
Mexico, it seems interesting to examine the relative importance of
these taxes. Accordingly, the column labeled “C&R1 open” in Table 3
shows consumption taxes related to international trade only (items
5 123, 5 124 and 5 127 from Revenue Statistics) using the tax base in
equation (5). The first row thus illustrates that slightly more than 5%
out of total consumption taxes (i.e., 0.7 over 13.2) are collected from
international trade in 1988. The relative importance of these taxes
reaches a maximum of 14% in 1992 and declines to levels of roughly
6% from 1995 on. Overall, consumption taxes raised from interna-
tional trade contribute between 5 and 14% out of total consumption
taxes for the period 1988-2002.11
Now it seems pertinent to explore why the Mendoza et al. and
Carey and Rabesona methods yield different trends for the consump-
tion tax in some particular years. In order to give some hint over this
difference, Table 4 presents how the consumption tax revenue is di-
vided among its different components. General (including VAT) plus
excise taxes amount to an average of more than 54% out of total con-
sumption tax revenue, where this share takes values between 43 and





















































































11 Consumption taxes from international trade average 0.7% as a share of GDP for the
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Table 4. Composition of Consumption Tax Revenue (in Percentage)
General + International Remaining
Year excise trade Other taxes taxes
1988 57.6 5.0 34.4 3.0
1989 54.2 8.5 33.8 3.5
1990 51.9 10.0 37.0 1.1
1991 50.9 12.3 35.2 1.6
1992 49.5 14.0 34.1 2.4
1993 51.4 12.2 33.5 2.9
1994 58.8 11.1 27.0 3.1
1995 46.8 6.8 43.9 2.5
1996 43.3 6.3 48.0 2.4
1997 48.2 6.0 43.2 2.6
1998 62.5 6.7 28.1 2.7
1999 66.0 6.9 24.7 2.4
2000 51.3 6.2 40.6 1.9
2001 57.7 5.2 34.9 2.2
2002 65.3 5.1 27.5 2.1
Average 54.3 8.2 35.1 2.4
Note: General plus excise refer to items 5 110 (5111 VAT) and 5 121 from OECD Revenue
Statistics, respectively; international trade include items 5 123, 5 124 and 5 127; other taxes
refers to item 5 128, “other taxes on specific goods and services”; remaining taxes include all the
remaining items (5 122, 5 126 and 5 200 excluding 5 212).
66% over the whole period. Remarkably, a substantial share (35% of
total consumption tax revenue) is collected from other taxes on spe-
cific goods and services on average (item 5 128 in Revenue Statistics).
This might not be surprising as item 5 128 for Mexico is entirely ex-
plained by taxes on oil production.
Since the method by Mendoza et al. does not include this item into
the analysis, and the share of this item in total consumption tax rev-
enue varies considerably over the period (ranging from 48 to 24.7% in
just a three year period, for example), it might not be surprising to
arrive at different results depending on the method in question.
III.2. Taxes on Factor Income
Now it is time to compare results among alternative methods for la-
bor and capital income taxes. Before presenting the estimates for these
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mation available on Mexico for total taxes on income, profits and capi-
tal gains (item 1 000 in Revenue Statistics) is not divided between
individuals and corporations (items 1 100 and 1 200, respectively). As
a reference, about 75% of these total taxes are paid by households in
OECD countries on average over the period 1995-2001, whereas the
remaining 25% is paid by corporations (OECD, 2003). Dalsgaard (2000)
shows evidence that the share of income taxation coming from corpo-
rations in Mexico is well above 50% in 1996. The author argues that
the higher share reported by Mexico in comparison with the OECD
average may be partially explained by differences in accounting prac-
tices (e.g., Mexico classifies payments from the self-employed as well
as some withholding taxes as corporate taxes). Due to the lack of fur-
ther evidence, the solution adopted here is to assume that 50% of total
taxes on income, profits and capital gains are paid by households,
whereas the remaining 50% is paid by corporations. An alternative
solution also considered in computations below assumes that only 25%
of these taxes are paid by households, a share roughly consistent with
the corresponding average for a sample of Latin American countries
(not including Mexico) for which data is available over the period 1990
to 1999 (Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 2002).
Average effective tax rates for labor income using the Mendoza et
al. method are presented in the second columns of Tables 5A and 5B.
These Tables assume that 50 and 25% of total taxes on income, profits
and capital gains are paid by households, respectively. From Table 5A,
the tax on labor income shows a slightly upward trend starting 1995
although the level in 2001 is still relatively low (about 13.4%). Assign-
ing a lower share of taxes paid by households reduce the estimates in
about 1.5 percentage points on average, as illustrated by the second
column of Table 5B. Nevertheless, these alternative time series esti-
mates are not affected qualitatively in general.
The third column of Tables 5A and 5B illustrate the estimates for
labor income taxes under the Carey and Rabesona approach (equa-
tion (6)). These new estimates are lower as compared to those by
Mendoza et al., and the decrease is about two percentage points on
average for each case. The next column in Tables 5A and 5B now report tax
estimates using equation (9), labeled as Gollin1. Here, it is important
to recall that this approach assumes that all the OSPUE is assigned to
labor. On average, the estimates for labor income taxes are even lower
under this specification as compared to the previous two methods.
Finally, estimates using equation (11) (namely, assuming that only202 Antón Sarabia: Average Effective Tax Rates in Mexico
Table 5A. Average Effective Tax Rates on Labor Income
(in Percentage)
Year Mendoza et al. C&R Gollin1 Gollin2
1993 12.1 10.0 9.0 10.3
1994 12.2 10.0 9.1 10.3
1995 11.8 9.4 8.4 10.0
1996 12.0 9.6 8.4 10.1
1997 12.6 10.3 9.1 10.9
1998 12.8 10.8 9.6 11.5
1999 13.2 11.6 10.3 12.5
2000 13.2 12.2 10.6 13.2
2001 13.4 12.4 11.0 13.7
Average 12.6 10.7 9.5 11.4
Table 5B. Average Effective Tax Rates on Labor Income
(in Percentage)
Year Mendoza et al. C&R Gollin1 Gollin2
1993 10.5 8.4 7.4 8.7
1994 10.6 8.4 7.5 8.7
1995 10.6 8.1 7.1 8.7
1996 10.7 8.3 7.0 8.8
1997 11.2 8.7 7.6 9.4
1998 11.3 9.1 7.9 9.9
1999 11.6 9.8 8.5 10.7
2000 11.6 10.3 8.8 11.3
2001 11.8 10.5 9.1 11.7
Average 11.1 9.1 7.9 9.8
Source: Author’s estimates as described in the text.
Table 5A assumes that 50% of total taxes on income, profits and capital gains (item 1 000
in OECD, Revenue Statistics) are paid by households.
Table 5B assumes that 25% of total taxes on income, profits and capital gains (item 1000 in
OECD, Revenue Statistics) are paid by households.
C&R: Carey and Rabesona (2002a) method.
Gollin1 and Gollin2: Alternative estimation methods following Gollin (2002).
a fraction of OSPUE goes to labor) are reported in the last column of
Tables 5A and 5B, labeled as Gollin2. Compared to the former method
(Gollin1), the tax on labor income is now roughly two percentage points
higher on average in each scenario. The result might not seem sur-
prising given the specification in (11) and (13) where α is between
zero and one.
Overall, from this analysis one may conclude that tax estimates
on labor are not qualitatively affected by alternative methods in gen-economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2005 203
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eral. In addition, the differences among these methods are not quanti-
tatively large on average: such differences are roughly at most of three
percentage points. These results are conveniently illustrated in Fig-
ure 4, based on the information provided in Table 5A.
Now consider the case of taxes on capital income. Estimates for
this variable under the alternative methods proposed are presented
in Tables 6A and 6B. Now Table 6A assumes that 50% of total taxes on
income, profits and capital gains are paid by corporations whereas
Table 6B increases this share to 75%. Thus, Tables 5A (Table 5B) and
6A (6B) are fully consistent with each other. Results under each method
are presented in columns as before. According to the approach by
Mendoza et al., tax on capital income presented in Table 6A follows a
decline of slightly more than three percentage points from 1993 to 1996.
Thereafter it increases steadily until reaching a level in 2001 roughly
similar to its level in 1994. This general result is also observed for the
remaining three methods, although the fall in capital income taxes
from 1993 to 1996 is even larger (about five percentage points) under
the Gollin1 method. Overall, quantitative differences among methods
may be as large as 5.5 percentage points on average. Figure 5 conve-
niently illustrates estimates for capital income taxes for all the meth-204 Antón Sarabia: Average Effective Tax Rates in Mexico
Table 6A. Average Effective Tax Rates on Capital Income
(in Percentage)
Year Mendoza et al. C&R Gollin1 Gollin2
1993 10.1 12.4 15.0 11.9
1994 9.6 11.8 14.1 11.3
1995 7.6 9.2 11.0 8.7
1996 7.0 8.2 9.9 7.9
1997 7.8 9.3 10.9 8.8
1998 8.1 9.6 11.3 9.1
1999 8.6 10.2 11.9 9.6
2000 8.7 10.4 12.5 9.8
2001 9.3 11.5 13.6 10.5
Average 8.5 10.3 12.2 9.7
Table 6B. Average Effective Tax Rates on Capital Income
(in Percentage)
Year Mendoza et al. C&R Gollin1 Gollin2
1993 11.3 14.5 18.3 13.9
1994 10.8 14.0 17.4 13.2
1995 8.5 10.8 13.4 10.0
1996 7.8 9.6 12.1 9.1
1997 8.7 11.0 13.5 10.2
1998 9.1 11.4 13.9 10.6
1999 9.6 12.2 14.8 11.1
2000 9.8 12.3 15.5 11.3
2001 10.4 13.7 16.9 12.2
Average 9.6 12.2 15.1 11.3
Source: Author’s estimates as described in the text.
Table 6A assumes that 50% of total taxes on income, profits and capital gains (item 1 000
in OECD, Revenue Statistics) are paid by corporations.
Table 6B assumes that 75% of total taxes on income, profits and capital gains (item 1 000
in OECD, Revenue Statistics) are paid by corporations.
C&R: Carey and Rabesona (2002a) method.
Gollin1 and Gollin2: Alternative estimation methods following Gollin (2002).
ods in question assuming that 50% of total income taxes are paid by
corporations.
Overall, the conclusion derived from Tables 3-6 and Figures 3-5 is
that all the alternative methods under study do not deliver tax esti-
mates that differ sharply in qualitative terms among them, with the
exception of consumption. For example, all the methods show that
taxes on labor income remained roughly constant during 1993-95 in
Mexico, whereas capital income taxes fell significantly during the sameeconomía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2005 205
12 See, for example, Mendoza et al. (1994), OECD (2001) and Carey and Rabesona (2002a).
Carey and Rabesona (2002a) find that the average effective tax rates on labor and capital in-
come in OECD countries (not including Mexico) for which information is available over the period
1990-2000 are 32 and 46%, respectively.
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period. Thereafter, both labor and capital income taxes have steadily
increased over time. Nonetheless, the levels estimated in 2001 are
still relatively low as compared with other OECD countries.12 Less can
be said about consumption taxes: they decrease steadily since 1988
until reaching its minimum level either in 1993 or 1994, and thereaf-
ter they either increase slightly or remain constant, depending on the
approach considered. As mentioned earlier, the difference is basically
explained by additional taxes in the Carey and Rabesona method not
considered in the Mendoza et al. approach.206 Antón Sarabia: Average Effective Tax Rates in Mexico
IV. Macroeconomic Implications
IV.1. Labor Supply and Labor Income Taxes
Now, it is time to check whether the tax estimates reported above are
consistent with predictions from theory. In a standard neoclassical
framework with a labor/leisure choice, steady-state labor supply may
be shown to be a function of income and consumption taxes, as well as
preference and technology parameters (cf. Mendoza and Tesar, 2005).
In particular, theory predicts a negative effect of labor income taxes
on labor supply. Thus, the purpose of this section is to confirm if this
prediction is observed in the data, both at the individual level for Mexico
and for a sample of countries. For that purpose, data on worked hours
for Mexico is taken from the OECD Labour Force Statistics Database,
where worked hours is defined as the average annual worked hours
per working-age person in employment. Data on labor income taxes is
provided by estimates in Table 5A.
Results on the relationship between these two variables are pre-
sented in Table 7 for the Mexican case. The first column reports the
contemporaneous correlation coefficient between hours worked and
taxes on labor income under alternative methods for the period 1993-
2001 (missing data on worked hours for 1994). Surprisingly, the corre-
lation coefficient is positive under all methods, ranging from 0.09 to
0.33. To check for the robustness of this result, an alternative approach
measuring the correlation between hours worked and the sum of la-
bor income and consumption tax rates is considered, as suggested by
Mendoza et al. (1994). Results are presented in columns 3 and 4 of
Table 7 depending on whether the consumption tax is defined follow-
Table 7. Contemporaneous Correlation between Hours Worked
and Taxation, 1993-2001
Method Corr. (τl) Corr. (τl + τc1) Corr. (τl + τc2)
Mendoza et al. 0.33 0.44 0.66
C&R 0.14 0.31 0.48
Gollin1 0.09 0.30 0.49
Gollin2 0.17 0.31 0.46
Note: τc1 and τc2 denote taxes on consumption estimated according to the Mendoza et al.
and Carey and Rabesona methods, respectively.
C&R: Carey and Rabesona (2002a) method.
Gollin1 and Gollin2: Alternative estimation methods following Gollin (2002).economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2005 207
ing the Mendoza et al. or the Carey and Rabesona method, respec-
tively. Once again, the correlation is positive and relatively large in
magnitude for all the cases.13
The positive correlation between hours worked and the labor in-
come tax (with or without consumption taxes) in Mexico stands in sharp
contrast with empirical results found in Mendoza et al. (1994). For
each of the G–7 countries except Italy, the authors report a negative
and large correlation between these two variables for the period 1965-
88 (the correlation ranges from –0.49 to –0.92). In this regard, two
comments are pertinent. First, the size of the informal labor market
in Mexico is large. According to OECD (2004a) and Dalsgaard (2002),
this share is between a quarter and one-half of total urban employ-
ment. Since information on average worked hours does not differenti-
ate between formal and informal workers, the evidence shown here
should be interpreted with caution. Second, tax estimates may be par-
ticularly sensitive to cyclical factors and unexpected shocks affecting
tax revenues and tax bases, as pointed out by Mendoza et al. (1994).
Thus, keeping in mind the particularities of the Mexican labor market,
the (possible large) business cycle effects and the fact that preference
and technology parameters may also affect labor supply, it remains an
open question to check whether these factors altogether could account
for the positive correlation observed in the data for Mexico.
The following step is to explore the implications from theory for a set
of countries. Recently, the literature has tried to find out what factors
could explain differences in average worked hours among economies.
For example, Prescott (2004) reports that Americans today work 50%
more than do the Germans, French, and Italians. This difference is
remarkable given that in the early 1970s Western Europeans worked
more than Americans. According to Prescott (2004), most of these large
differences in labor supply may be explained by differences in tax
rates on labor income for the G–7 countries.14 The natural implication
of this result is that countries with similar technologies and prefer-
ences but lower labor income taxes should exhibit higher worked hours
on average. Following with this argument, it might be expected that
Mexican workers would supply more labor than (say) French or Ger-
13 Similar results to those reported in Table 7 are found if labor tax estimates from Table
5B are used instead.
14 Mendoza et al. (1994) find that labor income taxes are substantially higher in France,
Germany and Italy as compared to those in the United States, Canada, Japan and the UK.208 Antón Sarabia: Average Effective Tax Rates in Mexico
Figure 6. Hours Worked versus Taxes on Labor Income, 1990-2000
man workers, given the low estimates for labor income taxes in Mexico
reported earlier.
To find out if this conjecture is observed in practice, data on both
average worked hours and effective tax rates on labor income are
needed for several countries. Due to limitations on data, the sample is
restricted to 23 OECD countries for which information is readily avail-
able. Since estimates on labor income taxes for Mexico start in 1993 as
reported above, the period under analysis is restricted to 1990-2000.
Data for average worked hours per year is taken from the OECD Labour
Force Statistics Database. Estimates for tax rates on labor income for
all the OECD countries in the sample except Mexico are taken from
Carey and Rabesona (2002b) using the Mendoza et al. methodology,
since taxes reported by Mendoza et al. (1994) only cover up to 1988.
The average of worked hours and labor income taxes for each coun-
try is presented in Figure 6 for the period 1990-2000 (1993-2000 for
the Czech Republic and Mexico). Remarkably, a negative relationship
between these two variables is found in the sample. In particular, high
labor-tax countries such as Denmark, Netherlands and Sweden ex-
hibit less worked hours on average than countries with lower labor
income taxes such as the US, Japan and Mexico. Even though Mexico
has substantially lower taxes than Japan, Greece and the Czech Re-
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those countries. Presumably preferences, technology or even institu-
tional factors (for example, the nature of the unemployment benefit
system in each country) might account for these differences.15
As additional evidence of the negative relationship found in Fig-
ure 6, a simple OLS regression using the above data yields the follow-
ing results:
23 . 0   adjusted   , 26 . 0 , 36 . 8 2015
2 2
, ) 1 . 3 ( ) 9 . 116 ( = = ε + τ − = R R H i i n i
where Hi denotes average worked hours in country i, τn,i is the aver-
age effective tax rate on labor income in country i, and εi is the error
term (numbers below in parenthesis denote the standard error). Thus,
the coefficient on labor income taxes is negative and significant at
standard confidence levels (5%), as expected.16 Remarkably, this nega-
tive and significant relationship is also found in Mendoza and Tesar
(2005) for a panel of G–7 countries over the period 1971-95.
IV.2. Private Investment/GDP Ratio and Capital Income Taxes
From a theoretical point of view, it is well-known that capital income
taxes have a negative effect on private investment/GDP ratio at the
steady state in a neoclassical setting (cf. Mendoza and Tesar, 2005).
Estimates on capital income taxes presented above may be thus used to
check if this prediction is observed in the data, both at the individual
level for Mexico and for a sample of countries.
Table 8 shows the contemporaneous correlation between total in-
vestment as a fraction of GDP and the alternative estimates on the
capital income tax for the period 1993 to 2001 in Mexico, using the in-
formation provided in Table 6A. As expected, the correlation between
these two variables is unambiguously negative for each of the methods
considered. If only private investment over GDP is taken into account,
the contemporaneous correlation coefficient is even larger in absolute
value, regardless of the approach used.17
15 These numbers should also be interpreted with caution given the differences in method-
ology to report hours worked in each country. See the OECD Labour Force Statistics Database
and OECD (2004b), Employment Outlook for details.
16 The coefficient on tn,i remains negative and significant if labor income taxes using the
Carey and Rabesona method are considered instead. Furthermore, this result is also robust to
a linear combination of consumption and labor income taxes.
17 Results in Table 8 only change slightly if estimates from Table 6B are used instead.210 Antón Sarabia: Average Effective Tax Rates in Mexico
Now consider the implications of neoclassical theory for a sample
of countries. If economies have similar technologies and preferences,
there should be a negative relationship between investment ratios
and capital income taxes in the data. Using a sample for 18 OECD
countries (not including Mexico) over the period 1965-91, Mendoza et
al. (1997) find that the coefficient on capital income tax is negative
and significant. In particular, the results imply that a reduction of 10
percentage points in capital income increases the private investment
rate between 0.9 and 1.4%. Similar quantitative results are also re-
ported in Mendoza and Tesar (2005) for a panel of G–7 countries over
the period 1971-95.
Given the low taxes on capital income in Mexico reported above, it
might be expected that Mexico (abstracting from technology and pref-
erences) should exhibit a higher investment rate than countries such
as the United States, Sweden and the UK on average, given that taxes
on capital income in these countries are generally above 35%. To check
if this prediction is consistent with the data, a sample of 24 OECD
countries is considered for which information on capital tax ratios is
readily available. As before, data on capital income taxes is taken from
Carey and Rabesona (2002b) using the Mendoza et al. approach. The
period of analysis is restricted to the years 1990-2000, given the limi-
tations on data for Mexico.18
Average investment rates and taxes on capital income for each
country are presented in Figure 7. As expected from theory, higher
taxes on capital income yield lower investment/GDP ratios in the sam-
18 Data for the Czech Republic and Mexico covers the period 1993-2000. Data for Portugal
is for 1990-98 only.
Table 8. Contemporaneous Correlation between Investment/GDP
and Capital Income Taxes in Mexico, 1993-2001
Total investment/GDP Private investment/GDP
Method Corr. (τk) Corr. (τk)




C&R: Carey and Rabesona (2002a) method.
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ple. In particular, low-tax countries such as Mexico, Greece and Korea
exhibit higher investment ratios than high-tax countries such as the
UK and Sweden. In fact, the most dramatic case in the sample is Swe-
den: it is the country with the highest tax on capital income and at the
same time the country with the lowest investment ratio. Despite the low
average tax rate in Mexico, there are four countries (Portugal, Japan,
the Czech Republic and Korea) where the investment ratio is higher
than Mexico’s. As for the case of labor supply analyzed earlier, differ-
ences in technology and/or preferences might account for this result.
To complete the analysis, a simple OLS regression using the above
data yields the following results:
22 . 0   adjusted   0.25,   , 13 . 0 68 . 23 ) / (
2 2
, ) 05 . 0 ( ) 74 . 1 ( = = ε + τ − = R R Y I i i k i
where (I/Y)i is the private investment/GDP ratio for country i, and τk,i
is the tax on capital income in country i. The coefficient on τk,i is nega-
Figure 7. Private Investment/GDP Ratio versus Taxes on Capital
Income, 1990-2000
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tive and significant at the 5% confidence level, as it might be expected.19
Remarkably, this number is very similar to those reported in Mendoza
et al. (1997) and Mendoza and Tesar (2005) under different samples
and periods of analysis. Therefore, the estimates for capital income
taxes presented in this paper yield results consistent with theory and
empirical evidence elsewhere.20
V. Conclusion
This paper has presented alternative methods to calculate average
effective tax rates on income and consumption in Mexico following
the general approach by Mendoza et al. (1994) and later extended by
Carey and Rabesona (2002a). Because of lack of detailed data, the
Mendoza et al. approach assumes that all income of the self-employed
is assigned to capital. A major problem with this assumption is that
estimates for labor (capital) income taxes are biased upward (down-
ward). Of course, this concern is avoided to the extent that data for
self-employed income from national accounts is disentangled between
its labor and capital components. Since this is not typically the case
even for data on industrialized countries, this paper provides two novel
methods in an attempt to compute tax ratios more precisely, following
the suggestions by Gollin (2002) to calculate factor incomes at the
aggregate level.
Results for the Mexican case show that there may be relatively
large differences in tax estimates on income among the four methods
under consideration. These differences may be as large as 5.5 percent-
age points on average. In particular, it is found that labor income taxes
are between 8 and 12.5%, whereas capital income taxes average be-
tween 8.5 and 15%. Nevertheless, results are qualitatively similar
among methods. For example, each of the four approaches exhibit a
steadily increase in income taxes for Mexico since 1996. In contrast,
estimates for consumption taxes may differ qualitatively depending
19 Despite the simplicity of this regression, this negative coefficient is presumably robust
and significant to alternative specifications. For example, Mendoza et al. (1997) perform a simi-
lar regression analysis in a smaller sample of OECD countries but additionally controlling for
variables such as the GDP level, changes in terms of trade, the GDP share of government pur-
chases and secondary education enrollment in each country. The coefficient on capital income
tax changes only slightly and remains significant at standard confidence levels.
20 A regression analysis was also performed for the same sample but using tax estimates
according to the Carey and Rabesona method. In such a case, the coefficient on the capital
income tax reduces to –0.10 but is still significant at the 5% confidence level.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2005 213
on the method used. The reason is that the Mendoza et al. approach
mostly includes VAT and excise taxes, but data for Mexico show that
these taxes only explain slightly more than 54% of all consumption
tax revenue. As a result, substantial differences in tax ratios arise as
consumption taxes may average between 7 and 14% depending on the
approach used. Overall, each method yields income and consumption
tax estimates for Mexico that are still too low as compared with tax
ratios in other OECD countries. This result might not be surprising
given the low ratio of tax revenues over GDP in Mexico, as discussed in
the text.
Average effective tax rates in Mexico are then used to check if
they are consistent with macroeconomic implications from theory, both
at the individual level and for a sample of countries. In particular, two
sets of exercises are considered: the relationship between hours worked
and the labor income tax, and the effect of taxes on capital income
over the investment ratio. It is found that, with the exception of labor
supply and labor taxes in Mexico, tax estimates deliver results consis-
tent with theory and empirical findings elsewhere. For example, an-
nual hours worked are higher in Mexico than Sweden on average,
given that taxes on labor income are four times larger in Sweden.
These empirical relationships are also supported by a simple regres-
sion analysis.
Remarkably, estimates presented in this paper compare relatively
well with those provided elsewhere for Mexico under similar and al-
ternative approaches. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) calculate marginal
individual income tax rates prevailing in 1984 for a series of countries in-
cluding Mexico. In this particular case, the authors find that the mar-
ginal income tax rate in 1984 is somewhere between 4 and 6%. Using
the Mendoza et al. approach (1994), Rico (1996) reports effective tax
rates on consumption, labor and capital income taxes of 7, 9.7 and 6%,
respectively for the period 1960-93 on average. Dalsgaard (2000) esti-
mates what he calls a theoretical effective tax rate for each income
category of wage earners in the formal sector by combining statutory
rates, tax credits and tax subsidies applying under the individual in-
come tax system at place in 1997. A nonweighted average yields an
individual income tax rate of 9.5% for that particular year.
The approach originally proposed by Mendoza et al. (1994) is ex-
tremely convenient in the sense that information required for estima-
tion is relatively easy to obtain. Furthermore, their method is quanti-
tatively consistent with alternative approaches in the literature. Thus,214 Antón Sarabia: Average Effective Tax Rates in Mexico
one may calculate tax ratios in a reliable way at a fraction of the cost
in terms of information. Of course, the estimation methods used in
this paper are far from perfect. As discussed by Carey and Rabesona
(2002a), issues as tax shifting are not taken into account because the
initial impact of taxes is assumed to be the final incidence. Thus, in
the presence of tax shifting, tax burdens using this methodology do
not correspond to the actual burdens impacting on economic incen-
tives. In addition, the tax treatment of losses, cross-border flows and
tax planning are also ignored, which might have an important effect,
especially on capital income tax estimates. On the other hand, one
might question the results since the approach presented here do not
use information on statutory tax rates, income distribution per tax
bracket or several particularities of the tax law. In fact, it may be
argued that average levels of taxation are not necessarily good ap-
proximations of the distortions created by the tax system, which are
primarily determined by marginal rates facing the taxpayer. Keeping
in mind all these possible caveats, it remains true that tax estimates
under this method may be a useful input for analysis, both in terms of
testing macroeconomic implications from theory as well as for policy
recommendations typically derived from well-specified, general equi-
librium models.
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